EPA Takes Over Cleanup of Toxic Ohio Train Derailment, With Norfolk Southern to Foot the Bill - YouTube

The Krink wrote:

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I forget what derailment of hazardous materials on the BNSF GPNW that started BNSF forwarding to authorities/fire depts etc
a list of everything every train had passing through their communities. I wonder if they ever look at it. Apparently NS doesnt do
this as the contents of this train would have been available immediately and not a mystery.

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 Kind of a funny question when you realize how hard it is for us to get accurate paper work.

Imagine pulling up behind a fire dept and walking in and asking them if they had a "good wheel" of our train.

https://www.fox19.com/2023/02/23/ntsb-report-out-ohio-train-derailment-read-it-here/

The NTSB report confirms a wheel on the train was too hot in the moments before the derailment - and a sensor failed to alert the crew.

Train 32N comprised 2 head-end locomotives, 149 railcars, and 1 distributed power locomotive located between railcars 109 and 110.

The positive train control system was enabled and operating at the time of the derailment.

Train 32N was operating with a dynamic brake application as the train passed a wayside defect detector on the east side of Palestine, Ohio, at milepost (MP) 49.81. The wayside defect detector, or hot bearing detector (HBD), transmitted a critical audible alarm message instructing the crew to slow and stop the train to inspect a hot axle. The train engineer increased the dynamic brake application to further slow and stop the train. During this deceleration, an automatic emergency brake application initiated, and train 32N came to a stop.

On the Fort Wayne Line of the Keystone Division, NS has equipped their rail network with HBD systems to assess the temperature conditions of wheel bearings while en route. The function of the HBD is to detect overheated bearings and provide audible real-time warnings to train crews. Train 32N passed three HBD systems on its trip before the derailment. At MP 79.9, the suspect bearing from the 23rd car had a recorded temperature of 38°F above ambient temperature. When train 32N passed the next HBD, at MP 69.01, the bearings recorded temperature was 103°F above ambient. The third HBD, at MP 49.81, recorded the suspect bearings temperature at 253°F above ambient.

NS has established the following HBD alarm thresholds (above ambient temperature) and criteria for bearings:

Between 170°F and 200°F, warm bearing (non-critical); stop and inspect

A difference between bearings on the same axle greater than or equal to 115°F (non-critical); stop and inspect

Greater than 200°F (critical); set out railcar

After the train stopped, the crew observed fire and smoke and notified the Cleveland East dispatcher of a possible derailment. With dispatcher authorization, the crew applied handbrakes to the two railcars at the head of the train, uncoupled the head-end locomotives, and moved the locomotives about 1 mile from the uncoupled railcars. Responders arrived at the derailment site and began response efforts.