Railroaders place to shoot the shit.

Troll · 500 - Internal Server Error

RE: Amtrak mishap on NS!!

Troll · 500 - Internal Server Error

Troll wrote:

Septa Main Line had all automatic signals removed a couple years back. You now totally rely on the cab signal....all interlockings have fixed home signals. It is common to have the cab speed indication (Flashing Green) and snake eyes staring at you at the next Int.

Of course for reference, review John All-Media's in depth report on the Dale Int. in 41 parts.

http://www.trainweb.org/phillynrhs/RPOTD070709.html

Part Forty One of an ongoing series. Part One is here, Part Two is here, Part Three is here, Part Four is here, Part Five is here, Part Six is here, Part Seven is here, Part Eight is here, Part Nine is here, Part Ten is here, Part Eleven is here, Part Twelve is here, Part Thirteen is here, Part Fourteen is here, Part Fifteen is here, Part Sixteen is here, Part Seventeen is here, Part Eighteen is here, Part Nineteen is here, Part Twenty is here, Part Twenty One is here, Part Twenty Two is here, Part Twenty Three is here, Part Twenty Four is here , Part Twenty Five is here, Part Twenty Six is here, Part Twenty Seven is here, Part Twenty Eight is here, Part Twenty Nine is here, Part Thirty is here, Part Thirty One is here, Part Thirty Two is here, Part Thirty Three is here, Part Thirty Four is here, Part Thirty Five is here, Part Thirty Six is here, Part Thirty Seven is here, Part Thirty Eight is here, Part Thirty Nine is here, Part Forty is here.

In Part Forty, the C&S crew had just installed the new signals (not yet in service) for the industrial, running and station tracks, and they were caged for their protection (the signals, not the C&S guys). Vandalism was the predicted culprit, but alas the vandals never even got a crack at them. The very first train to pass the new signals, CSX's C746 transfer run from Lansdale to South Philadelphia and back, evidently had a car with a clearance problem. Somewhere back in the consist, something caught the cage for the industrial track signal, dragging it across Main Street until it also took out the active signal for the running track.

-- Edited by Troll on Friday 27th of March 2009 05:57:16 PM

Troll · 500 - Internal Server Error

Amtrak engineer blamed for Chicago crash

CHICAGO - An Amtrak engineer was to blame for a crash in 2007 involving a speeding passenger train and a stopped freight train on Chicago's South Side that injured 71 people, federal safety officials ruled Tuesday (March 31), according to the Chicago Tribune.

The engineer of the Amtrak train failed to correctly heed a signal warning him to slow down and alerting him to the Norfolk Southern freight train stopped ahead, the National Transportation Safety Board found.

The NTSB faulted Amtrak for failing to make sure the engineer was trained to understand the different signals used by railroads on the routes over which he operated. Also contributing to the crash was a relief engineer's failure to communicate immediately to the engineer that he had misread the signal, the board concluded at a hearing in Washington.

The Amtrak train was headed to Union Station from Grand Rapids, Mich. It was traveling 25 miles an hour faster than the warning signal allowed on Nov. 30, 2007, when it plowed into the rear of the freight train.

Amtrak said it had worked closely with the NTSB during the investigation. "We will continue to improve supervision, competency testing, training and evaluation for Amtrak engineers, as recommended by the NTSB," said spokesman Marc Magliari. He said both engineers are no longer employed at Amtrak.

In its report, the safety board said the Amtrak engineer made "a significant error" when he misinterpreted the meaning of a track signal.

The "red over yellow" signal should have warned the crew to slow to 15 m.p.h. and to be prepared to stop for any trains or obstructions ahead.

But the engineer misinterpreted the signal as a "slow approach," which would have let him operate at a maximum speed of 30 m.p.h. while being prepared to stop at the next signal, the report said.

(This item appeared in the Tribune April 1, 2009.)

April 1, 2009

Snippy · Force Majeure

Snippy is shocked at the NTSB finding.

Now, how about addressing "red over yellow"?

Cy Valley · Upgraded Condition

Snippy wrote:

Snippy is shocked at the NTSB finding.

Now, how about addressing "red over yellow"?

Snippy is so naive. It must be the third person thing.

Snippy · Force Majeure

Bah on jealous hader *cy*!

Cy Valley · Upgraded Condition

Ah, Snippy, the things we both missed out on. Or caught the tail end of.

Pipes FC · Enemy of the State

Article wrote:

The Amtrak train was headed to Union Station from Grand Rapids, Mich. It was traveling 25 miles an hour faster than the warning signal allowed on Nov. 30, 2007, when it plowed into the rear of the freight train.
But the engineer misinterpreted the signal as a "slow approach," which would have let him operate at a maximum speed of 30 m.p.h. while being prepared to stop at the next signal, the report said.

But he was doing 40mph? So I guess he misinterpreted his misinterpretation.

Snippy · Force Majeure

NTSB Agrees With Snippy!!!

Recently, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued its findings regarding a 2007 collision between a Norfolk Southern train and an Amtrak train which occurred near Chicago. The recommendation was issued to address a long-standing problem with non-standardized signals between railroads and territories, which contributed to the misinterpretation of a signal by the Amtrak crew involved in the accident, and the failure to resolve the miscalled signal prior to the accident. The NTSB recommended that the FRA establish uniform signal aspects that railroads must use to authorize a train to enter an occupied block, and prohibit the use of these aspects for any other signal indication. It also recommended that the FRA study the different signal systems for trains, identify ways to communicate more uniformly the meaning of signal aspects across all railroad territories, and require the railroads to implement as many uniform signal meanings as possible.

The Board determined that if Positive Train Control (PTC) had been in use, the accident would have been prevented by stopping the train when it exceeded restricted speed. The Rail Safety Act passed in January mandates the implementation of PTC by all railroads before 2014. The recommendation has been made that all railroads, Amtrak, AAR, ASLRRA, the BLET and UTU use the circumstances of this accident to re-emphasize during training to communicate any disagreement on a signal call immediately and if needed, to take action to ensure the train is operated safely.