Railroaders place to shoot the shit.

In response to specific questions asked by the FRA at a recent public hearing, the UTU and five other rail labor organizations jointly responded with regard to permissible use of certain locomotives, required enforcement of PTC's ability to correct train overspeed, permissible use of non-PTC equipped or functional trains on PTC-required track, and use of unequipped trains and failed PTC trains.

* The location of PTC-equipped locomotives in the engine consist: The FRA asked how a railroad is to handle a situation where an engine that is PTC-equipped is positioned with long hood forward or has a broken air conditioning unit. 

Responsible operating personnel recognize that operating a North American cab locomotive in the long hood forward position is patently unsafe and should only be permitted for short distances and then only in emergency situations, said the labor organizations.

Operating trains with the long hood forward presents safety concerns because the engineer has a limited view of the railroad with that configuration. 

If any safety feature or safe practice is impaired, altered or compromised in any locomotive," said the labor organizations, "it should not be in the lead or operating position of the train."

If the engine is not equipped with air conditioning or if the long hood is facing forward, the railroad would have three choices, said the labor organizations: 1) grant the crew the right to switch a fully compliant locomotive to the lead at the first location where this can be accomplished; 2) do not operate the train at all; or, 3) remove the engine from the engine consist entirely.

That approach, said labor, "would create the safest possible working environment for the employees. Obviously, the safest locomotive is the one with PTC, AC and the short hood forward."

* Overspeed derailments: The FRA says that a requirement of a PTC system is to prevent "overspeed derailments, including derailments related to railroad civil engineering speed restrictions, slow orders, and excessive speeds over switches and through turnouts."

The labor organizations point out that while the term, "prevent overspeed derailments" accurately reflects the language found in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, the FRA proposal "misses the congressional intent of the statute and it appears to be unenforceable unless a derailment occurs in conjunction with a PTC system which fails to enforce an overspeed event."

The labor organizations suggest the FRA amend the proposed regulation "to establish that it is a violation [of regulations] if the PTC system fails to enforce an overspeed condition which is not corrected by the locomotive engineer regardless of whether or not such overspeed results in a derailment. Since most overspeed occurrences do not result in a derailment, waiting for a derailment to happen before declaring the PTC system is not operating as intended is contrary to the purpose of the law."

* Determinations of PTC-required track: The labor organizations told FRA that routing established by railroads before PTC was required establishes what the railroad deemed the safest and most direct routes for the transport of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) and poison inhalation hazard (PIH) chemicals. The labor organizations said they oppose the railroads' desire to reroute hazmat consists through densely populated areas and on tracks used by commuter trains, which greatly increases the risk of a catastrophic event.

FRA," said the rail organizations, "should avoid giving the railroads a financial incentive to reroute TIH and PIH through densely population areas, onto commuter routes and onto our nations Interstate highway system."

* Unequipped trains and failed PTC trains: "Any train invisible to the PTC system in PTC territory presents an unacceptable risk," said the labor organizations. They suggested that the FRA "reevaluate its position on these matters and take the safe course of action by reducing the maximum speed to restricted under such conditions or use other methods as temporal separation."

* Other comments: The UTU and five other rail labor organizations also observed that "in the haste to implement [new regulations governing PTC operations] it is possible and even probable that FRA has unintentionally traded some of the safety-critical elements found [in existing regulations] for a stream-lined process. The labor organizations said the FRA "is very likely overlooking safety critical elements whose deficiencies have yet to be identified.

"We implore FRA to adequately staff those who are assigned with making the safety determination in the approval process so that anything missed in the haste of developing this rule may be caught when FRA evaluates each element in each proposed system for certification and approval," said the labor organizations.

The labor organizations offering the joint comments include the UTU, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, the American Train Dispatchers Association, the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division, the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

Click here to read the entire submission by the UTU and other labor organizations.